Belligerent party being the target of military operations is under obligation to protect civilian population under its control by taking passive precautions and avoid using human shields. Prima facie such obligation is bound to the concept of "military objective", since non-military objectives are already "immune" from targeting. However, such approach does not take into account the fact that the states have not been able to agree upon unified interpretation of the military objective. It seems counterproductive to limit the obligations to protect civilians only to military objectives. Furthermore, the law does not necessarily support such approach. While the Additional Protocol I speaks of military objectives in the passive precautions, it also includes an overall clause to protect civilians, and the specific references to military objectives should be taken as examples instead of limiting the overall obligations to protect civilians. There is no real reason to tie the obligations to protect civilians to military objectives and allow targeted party into neglecting its duties to protect civilians.
Introduction
Human shields, while prohibited, continue to be an issue in contemporary armed conflicts. Most recently Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) started shielding their troops' escape routes by civilian presence to avoid getting targeted. 2 Human shields cause significant harm to the adversary's ability to target legitimate military targets by principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks if the collateral civilian casualties and damages would be disproportionate when 1 This article is the result of the project conducted at the Palacký University Faculty of Law IGA_PF_2016_007.
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The Guardian 19 August 2016. [online] . Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/aug/19/isis-civilians-syria-manbij-human-shield> compared to the military advantage presented. 3 However, civilian casualties can also influence the targeting decisions by other means than legal prohibitions. Increasing civilian suffering, even when caused by the conduct of the party being the object of the attacks, can hurt the war effort of the party employing force against human shielded targets by causing political backlashes and lower the backing from military partners, international community, media or civil societies, and offer new ground for recruitment to their adversaries. 4 International law, mainly in Additional Protocol 1 and customary international law prohibits the use of civilian population to "render certain points or areas immune from military operations. "
5 Also the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) criminalises the conduct. Closely connected with the prohibition of human shields are the passive precautions, which obligate the belligerent party facing a military strike to take precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects in its control. 6 However, despite the clear prohibition the law is not without questions. The passive precautions 7 and the prohibition of human shields 8 are often related to military targets. That is further confirmed by the Rome Statute, where the delegates during the drafting face of the statute felt that the wording of "render certain points or areas immune" would not make sense unless it the shielding was done to protect military targets from targeting. 9 Similarly the elements of crimes document on use of human shields confirms that use of human shields is prohibited only when they are shielding military targets. 10 Certainly, non-military objects would already be "immune" from attacks in a sense that their targeting is already prohibited by international law. Yet the prohibition of human shields assumes that there is a standardized interpretation of the term "military object", which is not the case. This paper shows that international law lacks a standardized interpretation of what or who can be legitimately targeted. This is especially present in the so called war on terror, where states are more inclined to target terrorists' economy by destroying targets of economic significance to hinder terrorists' abilities to conduct hostilities, despite opposition from academics. 11 The question therefore arises whether the prohibition of human shields applies to cases where the targeted party is using human shields to protect targets that it does not deem military targets, when there is possibility that the illegitimate targets could be targeted nevertheless.
The second chapter explains the specifics of the prohibition of human shields while the third chapter opens up the passive precautions under the law of armed conflict. Fourth chapter deals with principle of distinction and brings up the issues regarding the definition of military objectives (A) and combatants (B). Fifth chapter looks into the issues of what the differentiated definitions of legitimate military targets bring to the obligations to protect civilians of the party being the object of the attack. This paper then concludes that the obligations to take passive precautions and prohibition of use of human shields must not be limited to strict definition of legitimate military targets but should include all targets that are in fact liable for attacks despite the legality of such attacks. The paper argues that it would be counterproductive to get tied too tightly to the concept of military targets regarding the passive precautions and human shields, especially when the international community fails to agree upon the exact limits of rules of targeting.
Prohibition of human shields
Human shields refer to civilians that are being used to render targets or areas immune from military operations. The need to legislate such behaviour came from the public population's and the states' shock of the use of human shields during the Second World War. 12 While fortunately rare events, it was still felt that there was a need for prohibiting such actions.
13 Therefore the prohibition of human shields was included to third and fourth Geneva Conventions regarding prisoners of war 14 and non-national civilians under party's control. 15 Eventually Additional Protocol 1 widened the scope to all protected persons and civilians, regardless of their nationality, stating that "the presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations. "
16 Furthermore, the Rome Statute criminalized the use of human shields.
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The prohibition of human shields goes also further than merely forcefully placing civilians at the military targets. Shields do not have to be aware of being used as shields and as the term "movement" in the AP1 definition tells, it also prohibits military personal from mingle with civilian population for protection. 18 The question of whether civilians are being used as human shields comes down to the intent of the party using them. 19 When the party intents to render objects immune from military operations by human shields, such act constitutes a breach of Article 51(7) of AP1 and a war crime under the Rome Statute. While the specific intent is difficult to verify from afar and without mind-reading abilities, 20 that issue is not solely related to human shields. Similar problem exists with some other international crimes requiring specific intent, which have been successfully applied also in practice. 21 Similarly, the intent to shield military targets can be verified from circumstances, such as continuingly doing the same action of abusing the presence of human shields when facing enemy combatants. 22 However, it can be questioned whether the prohibition of human shields covers cases where human shields are acting voluntarily, without the need for being coerced for shielding the targets. Firstly, it comes down to the question of whether voluntary human shields are "directly participating in hostilities", 23 for which the answer must be negative. 24 While voluntary human shields can indeed be more effective in shielding military targets from attacks, 25 the shields offer nothing as military advantage per se. Their ability to shield is done by merely causing a legal or moral obstacle for the attacker, which hardly qualifies as hostile act and direct participation causing actual harm to the enemy. 26 If the legal obstacle would be then taken away by ignoring their civilian status, they would no longer bring any advantage to the protection of military targets, legal or otherwise.
Some authors argue that since AP1 terminology of "using the presence or movement of civilians" should cover also passive indifference towards voluntary human shields since long-lasting ignorance to voluntary human shields would 18 30 This approach was also agreed in the Rome Statute's commentary, noting that human shield's motivation is irrelevant but the act of the authorities using the shields is sufficient by itself.
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While it is not exactly stated in the legislation that the prohibition of human shields is limited to only military targets, one could argue that it is strongly implied by the term "render certain points immune from military action. " Since non-military targets are already immune from military action, it should then follow that only legitimate military targets can be shielded by human shields. Similar approach was chosen in the Rome Statute, where the drafters confirmed the logic in the elements of crime. 32 However, the immunity does not necessarily refer to legal immunity. The only way how the military target could be made (legally) immune is by abusing the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks if the collateral civilian casualties and damages would be disproportionate when compared to the military advantage presented. 33 However, the term "immunity" arises from fourth and third Geneva Conventions, while the principle of proportionality was not codified until Additional Protocol I. Certainly the "immune" does not refer only to legal immunity but can be taken as to refer to targets being immune in military sense or forcing attacker to abandon their operations over the moral reasons for not wishing to kill civilians or prisoners of war. AP1 and the Geneva Conventions' prohibition of human shields only applies to international armed conflicts and Rome Statute criminalization of human shields is applicable to only international armed conflict. However, there are arguments the prohibition of human shields has been crystalized as a customary law also in internal armed conflicts. 35 ICRC study on customary international law quotes numerous military manuals and statements of states and UN condemning use of human shields in internal armed conflicts as a proof of that.
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Further the prohibition of human shields has been linked to general requirement to protect civilians in Additional Protocol II. 37 ICTY also judged use of human shields to be under inhumane and cruel treatment, 38 which is prohibited by the ICTY statute in both international and internal armed conflict 39 and Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions applicable to internal armed conflicts. 40 However, since ICTY cases were solely about forced human shields, 41 it is unclear whether the use of voluntary human shields would also be prohibited in internal armed conflicts. Similarly, the inhumane and cruel treatment requires for the victims to be aware of the possible attacks against which they are shielding, 42 which is not the case with prohibition of human shields.
Passive Precautions
Closely related to the prohibition of human shields are passive precautions, obligating the party being on the receiving end of an attack to take certain precautions to protect civilian population and objects under its control from the dangers of attacks. The precautions are listed in Additional Protocol Article 58, obligating a party to remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives, 43 avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas 44 and take all other necessary precautions to protect civilians. 45 While they are closely related to the prohibition of human shields, there are significant differences between them. The prohibition of human shields is an absolute prohibition that constitutes a war crime. 46 Passive precautions on the other hand are positive obligations requiring a good faith attempt from the party subject to an attack to protect its civilians with the best of its ability, not merely to avoid abusing the civilian population to shield military targets. 47 The passive precautions have been called "distinction enablers", as they help the adversary party to distinguish between military and civilian targets and carry out attacks only against the military targets. 48 The passive precautions' open ended obligation to take "all other necessary precautions indicts that the list is not exhaustive but the party must pay care to the civilian population and objects under its control. 49 ICRC commentary explains the "all other necessary precautions" as making shelters which offer adequate protection available for civilian population and having well organized and equipped civil defence forces at place. 50 However, ICRC study on customary law includes also precautions such as distribution of information and withdrawing civilian population to safe places. 51 Therefore while the specific examples of Article 58(a) and (b) speaks of military objectives, the open-ended Article 58(c) could include general obligation to evacuate civilians also from non-military targets if they are in danger. This can happen especially if the adversary is inclined to target non-military targets or the parties fail to agree what constitutes a military object.
Thirdly, while the prohibition of human shields is an absolute prohibition, obligations to take passive precautions must be taken only to "maximum extent feasible". 52 The term "feasible" has been criticized for making the precautions seem more of recommendations than actual obligations 53 and be counterproductive if the humanitarian measures can be ignored when there are overwriting military reasons to do so. 54 However, merely the fact that the obligations to take passive precautions are not absolute does not make then something less than a hard law. 55 The term "feasible" was meant to refer to the idea that states are not obligated to do the impossible to protect civilians. 56 Similarly states cannot be obligated to follow precautions as absolute prohibitions when said prohibi- 57 That follows the idea that IHL should not prohibit things that are likely to happen and cannot alter the power relations, as states would not follow too strict rules hindering their efforts to carry military operations. 58 However, that approach cannot be taken to limitless heights and even the "feasible" precautions have effect on states conduct and might influence their ability to carry out operations.
Principle of Distinction
Considering that both passive precautions and prohibition of human shields lean towards the "military objective" term, it appears useful to define the terms. However there are wide gaps between states' understanding of what constitutes a legitimate military target and also the practice in this regard is far from uniform. This chapter seeks to show some of the differences in the definitions to show that there can be instances where a party would want to use human shields to shield targets that it does not deem military targets, as long as the adversary party still plans to target them.
The principle of distinction is fundamental principle of IHL, differentiating between legitimate military targets that can be attacked and civilian objects and population that are protected from direct attacks. 59 Those groups of people are defined by mutually exclusive standards, i.e. every object or person is either legitimate target or not. 60 Further, some of the protected groups are defined by negative. Civilians, who are protected from direct attacks, are all persons who do not fulfil the criteria of combatants in third Geneva Convention Article 4(a)1,2,3 and 6. 61 However, civilians can lose their protected status when they are directly participating in the hostilities. 62 Similarly, civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives. 63 The following sub-chapters lays out the definitions of military objectives and combatants and aims to show that the states have not accepted the definitions in practice, but seemingly define the concepts differently from each other.
Since the human shielding can happen in two different ways, it is important to look into both definitions and interpretations. Firstly, states can try to immunize military targets by placing civilians in the vicinity of the military objectives or by placing movable military objectives into the vicinity of civilian population. However, it is also possible for combatants to mingle within civilian popula- tion, which has lately been the prevalent method of human shielding in conflict against the ISIS, where combatants have used civilian population to shield their flight from areas they have lost. 64 
Military objective
While much of the early IHL stated that states should use force only against military objectives, 65 the law lacked agreed definition of the term. 66 It was finally defined in an agreed manner in Additional Protocol I Article 52, 67 which defines military objectives as "objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. "
68 However, despite its status as a one of the main principles of IHL, 69 the concept is criticized for being too abstract and unspecific for actual usage. 70 The obscurity of the definition of military objective is clear from the fact that states keep interpreting the term differently in different conflicts. As an example of this, one can look into the targets of economic value. As a starting point, much of academia and historically most states (although not including US among others) have denied the possibility of using force against economic targets to cripple adversaries war fighting capabilities. 71 However, recent state practice seems to be changing. Firstly, NATO started targeting Afghanistan drug fields as military objectives, reasoning it by the economic support that the illegal drug trade gives to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. 72 However, the targeting decision did not receive unilateral support and forced NATO to act in caveats as certain members refused the orders over the threat of breaching their obligations under IHL. 73 Yet, such issues are no longer present during the air campaigns against ISIS controlled oil refineries. Most states taking part in the air campaign against ISIS has been targeting the oil refineries and there is a considerable lack of objections from elsewhere. 74 However, originally oil refineries were held as military objectives because they contributed oil to the needs of the military directly, and therefore their destruction offered definite military advantage. 75 But objects are not military objectives merely "by tradition" because they used to be contributing to the military action, but every object must be judged case-by-case basis. 76 Most of the talk about ISIS controlled oil refineries has been around their monetary contributions to the ISIS campaign. 77 Yet one could claim that ISIS military still uses some of the oil for its operations and that the economic reasons are not in any way the basis of the justifications for the air strikes. 78 Definitely the fact that there are secondary advantages or goals arising from destroying the oil refineries it does not make the original legal justification for the attacks invalid as long as the strikes can be justified by it. Yet it is hard to give similar justifications for the operations to destroy so called "ISIS banks", where the targeted object is literally money. 79 It is difficult to find clearer economic target than that. The air operations against ISIS show a clear pattern of economic warfare.
However, the campaign against ISIS economy has obtained some success. ISIS has been forced the group to cut back salaries and bonuses and find new methods of generating money, which cannot compete with the old oil revenue. 80 This has prompt arguments claiming that the economic targets can be targeted when the military advantage, as in the ISIS' case the upkeep of the military, is more definite because of its status as an indispensable and principal source of income. 81 That would exclude economic targets that would give hypothetical advantage, but allow the destruction of terrorists' main source of income. However, it is still unclear how definite the military advantage is from the lack of funds that ISIS suffering from. The militants are still fighting without clearly perceived change. Therefore, it is still questionable to target even significant and indispensable sources of economy under the IHL. Another justification given to the ISIS operations is that it would be more justified to apply the wider definition of military objects as they are using the oil for illegal oil trade and smuggling to finance illegal terrorist activities. 82 However, that would clearly violate the principle of equal application of IHL. The law should be applied equally to all belligerents regardless of their motivations or perceived justifications. 83 Therefore the easy answer of changing the law for terrorist operations should be resisted.
The main player using the wider definition of military objectives is the United States. 84 While AP1 defines the military objectives as objects whose destruction offers definite military advantage, United States uses terminology of objectives that brings "effective contribution to war-fighting or war-sustaining capabilities. " 85 The change in terminology allows the wider targeting practice of United States against economic targets.
86 Since the ISIS bank strikes are conducted by US, one could justify that by arguing that US are following more lenient definition of the military objective arising from customary international law. 87 
Combatants
Combatants can often abuse the civilian presence for their own advantage by mingling within the civilian population and even forcing civilians to travel in the same group. However, issues similar to the definition of military objective exist within the combatant definitions, and one must ask whether it is similarly illegal to shield personal who are in danger of being targeted even when they are already protected from direct targeting. The term combatants have been defined in Third Geneva Convention Article 4(1), (2), (3) and (6) as members of armed forces, members of militias and irregular resistance groups, members of armed forces who professes allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the adversary or inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who take arms spontaneously against the invading forces. 93 However, especially the irregular resistance groups and militias causes confusion on the rules of targeting. Firstly, while terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS definitely have militias or organized armed groups, the whole group is not necessarily performing combatant functions. Mere membership to a terrorist group is not enough to make anyone a legitimate military target. 94 They need to perform combatant functions in the group to be considered legitimate targets.
Similarly, to military objectives, recently states have stared interpreted the concept of combatant functions more broadly. NATO has been targeting Afghan narcotic personal, 95 and the Western Alliance has been conducting operations against ISIS recruiters and media experts 96 and financers and oil-smuggling administrators. 97 While it is unclear whether the targeted persons conducted also actual combatant functions on top of their other affairs, the mere support to war-effort did not make them combatants or civilians directly participating in the hostilities. 98 They are merely supporting the war-effort of the terrorist group and therefore indirectly participating in the hostilities. 99 However, if they do also have combatant roles, the fact that there are alternative motivations for their targeting would not make the original justifications illegitimate. Yet at least in some cases it seems that the combatant functions were lacking and they were targeted solely on their responsibilities over task supporting the overall war effort.
In the end it seems that states and academic writers have not been able to agree on the interpretation of, the very least in practice, on what or who can be legitimately targeted under the principle of distinction. Even within close allies such as NATO the member states do not interpret the law in a unified manner. Especially during the "war of terror" and terrorist operations the states have been inclined to wider the definitions to allow more flexibility in their targeting practices. However, such ever-changing definitions cause obscurity to all parties involved in the conflict and as the next chapter shows, could possibly have effect on the obligations of the party which is being the target of the military operations.
Effect of undefined military objective to prohibition of human shields
Following with the differentiated definitions and applications of military targets, when are adversaries prohibited from shielding targets by using human shields or obligated to take passive precautions to protect civilian population? Are their obligations limited only to their understanding of what constitutes a military target or should it go further, even beyond the generally accepted limits of Additional Protocol 1? Both prohibition of human shields and passive precautions aim to protect civilian population under the control of the party being the object of the attack, although choosing different methods of protection. Certainly since the limitations of military targets causes difficulties to the passive precautions, it would be logical to avoid same issues with human shields in an attempt to widen the prohibition of human shields. Even if the prohibition of human shields would be limited to military targets, targeted party would still breach its obligations under IHL by failing to take passive precautions. This chapter argues that it would be most suitable for passive precautions and prohibition of human shields not to make differentiation between military targets and civilian objects but to obligate states to take care of the civilian population that might be in danger from military operations regardless of their interpretation of legitimate military target.
While the passive precautions speak of removing civilians from the vicinity of military objectives 100 and avoiding locating military objectives within or near to densely populated areas, 101 the list is not exhaustive 102 but includes also the more general obligation to "take all necessary precautions to protect civil- 112 Unsurprisingly, Serbia also claimed that the attack constituted a war crime. 113 However, also France and United Kingdom, NATO states and participants in the conflict, disapproved the attacks over the questions of legality. 114 The biggest issue at the strike was that while NATO gave a prior warning that the TV station will be targeted, it was given weeks before the actual strikes and the Yugoslavian authorities no longer believed that the attacks were incoming. 115 Arguably the warning was not effective, although NATO justifies that by claiming that a waning could endanger the pilots and would not be feasible to give. Now, whether Yugoslavia breached their obligations to take passive precautions has not been ruled as ICTY focused on individual criminal responsibility, which passive precautions do not bring.
Generally, the obligations to protect civilians, which is the intent of passive precautions and included in Article 58(c) general clause, do not depend on reciprocity. 116 Interestingly Yugoslavian courts sentenced the head of Radio Television Serbia for 10 years over failure to protect the employees at the TV station, with the court stating that the duty to protect was not cancelled by NATO's illegal conduct. 117 While the conviction did not arise from breach of Geneva Conventions or a war crime trials, it can be taken as a relevant factor when thinking about the passive precautions. Similarly, one could use the human rights law's right to life and its obligations to evacuate civilians from danger arising from natural disaster as a complementary to similar principle under IHL in cases where the targets of illegal attacks are known or suspected and the evacuations could be feasible. 118 The situation for human shields is slightly different. While it is not exactly stated in the legislation that the prohibition of human shields is limited to only military targets, it is strongly implied by the term "render certain points immune from military action. " Since non-military targets are already immune from military action, it should then follow that only legitimate military targets can be shielded by human shields. Similar approach was chosen in ICC Rome Statute, where the drafters confirmed the logic in the elements of crime.
119 However, using human shields in situations where the targets are not military targets would fall within the prohibition of hostages if they are forced to shield the target. 120 The definition of hostages do not include requirement of putting them in military targets, but prohibits any threat of killing or injuring persons in order to compel a third party to do or abstain from doing something.
121 ICTY, lacking jurisdiction over the crime of use of human shields, especially used the prohibition of hostages to cover the use of human shields during the conflict. 122 However, since the prohibition of human shields also include cases where the protected persons are not forced to act as shields, but merely compelled and directed by the authorities for their actions, not all human shields fall within the prohibition of hostages.
Are voluntary human shields, that are being directed by the authorities to the correct places prohibited in cases where there is confusion over the military character of the target? Obvious problem is that there should be no need or use to shield non-military targets. However, as shown earlier, states can still target non-military objects when they either misinterpret the information about those targets or when they wish to use wider definition, arguably outside the scope of the legal definitions. Such examples can be taken from non-military leadership of terrorist organizations, such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda. Especially since ISIS is behaving more like a state authority than cell-structured terrorist organization, not everyone who is connected to it are legitimate targets.
Secondly, similar logic as with passive precautions could be suitable. Since the IHL has the obligation to communicate one's interpretation and application of the understanding of the law, shielding those targets could then be illegal. Especially since Rome Statutes annexed elements of crimes part, which explicitly lays out the requirement to shield military targets, is not fully legally binding document but just meant to be used as an interpretative guidance. 123 Even if the party executing the attack would be violating principle of distinction, the human shields could still "immunize" the target from attacks over the threat of larger collateral damages. The terminology "render certain points or areas immune from military operations" already existed in Geneva Convention IV 124 while the only method to legally immunize military targets, the principle of proportional- ity, was codified only in Additional Protocol I, 28 years later than the original Geneva Conventions. Therefore, the immunizing cannot be taken to refer only as legal immunizing but also in military terms to hide behind the shields. 125 But arguably the term of "immunizing" would not be limited to physical immunity. Similarly use of human shields can "immunize" a target by causing the party carrying out the attack to cancel the attacks over the threat of political backlash, moral reasons or over fears of harming party's own prisoners of war.
It would be advisable to focus more on the intent of the authorities using the shields than the differentiated locations. While there are inherent problems with the issues with ruling based on the intent, they can be overcome. International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda noticed the problems in Akayesu judgment when discussing the specific intent of committing a genocide, stating that "On the issue of determining the offender's specific intent, the Chamber considers that intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible, to determine. " 126 However, the court managed to solve the issue by inferring the intent from "certain number of presumptions of fact" and from the general context, general nature or scale of the atrocities. 127 Similarly, use of human shields can be determined from the scale and general nature of the behaviour. If it is continuing, such as in the case of Iraq soldiers moving within civilian population every time US assault helicopters came visible, that could be inferred as an intent to shield.
128 Furthermore, there can be other trails of evidence as orders or witnesses in cases where civilian population has been ordered to shield military targets. The question of illegal human shielding is a legal question to be determined by the courts and should not have any effect regarding adversaries' obligations in conducting warfare. Therefore, even if the determination of intent is complicated, it should not cause unbearable difficulties.
In the end using human shields to deter adversary from targeting targets that do not constitute legitimate military targets comes dangerously close to enforcing international humanitarian law by placing protected persons into danger. The object of the provisions prohibiting the use of human shields is to protect civilians and prisoners of war from the dangers of warfare. In cases where illegitimate targets are being targeted, same dangers exist to the civilians as when they are shielding targets that are legitimate military targets. 
Conclusion
While passive precautions and prohibition of human shields strongly lean still to the concept of military object, that does not take into account the fact that the terminology and interpretations have not been fully agreed upon and differ greatly between states. Especially in the more recent conflicts against armed non-state actors states have sought for wider and more flexible definitions of legitimate targets, which are not necessarily accepted by the adversaries. On the first look, one could assume that those who breach their obligations not to use human shields and take passive precautions could hide behind their own, narrower definition of military object to escape liability over the violations.
Passive precautions are general protection regime for the civilians under the control of a state party in an armed conflict. While Additional Protocol I specifically points out that the parties must remove civilian population from military objectives 129 and avoid locating military objectives in vicinity of civilian population, 130 those should be taken as examples of passive precautions instead of limiting clauses to state party's obligations to protect civilian population under its control. The party should pay attention to possible victims whether they are in vicinity of military targets or merely in a threat of suffering from other, possibly illegal, military operations targeting objectives that the targeted party does not deem military objectives. This approach finds support from other regimes of law as well, including human rights law.
Similarly, prohibition of human shields should focus on the intent of the party abusing the human shields, not on the specific target that is being shielded. The codification of prohibition of human shields and the terminology of "making certain points immune" came before the proportionality principle, which is the method for legally shielding military targets from targeting. Therefore, the term immunizing should refer to also other methods of influencing targeting decisions than legal obstacles of proportionality principle. Similarly, even if such shields would be voluntary and therefore would not fall within the prohibition of hostages or inhumane treatment (which requires suffering to human shields and holding them against their will) they would still be placed into danger by the targeted party. There is no such possibility of using human shields against targets that a party does not know or believe could be attacked against for the simple reason that there would not be an intent to shield such targets. The highlighting of military targets in both passive precautions and prohibition of human shields serves as a valuable example of the prohibited conduct. But before the exact interpretation of military targets can be found, it would be counterproductive to limit the obligations to protect civilian population, either by prohibition of human shields or passive precautions, to merely military targets. 
